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SURVEY SECTION
Criminal Law. Hampton v. State, 786 A.2d 375 (R.I. 2001). Pro-
bation revocation justice did not violate the defendant's right to
due process by failing to advise the defendant of his right to appeal
the revocation adjudication because Rule 32 of the Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure does not apply to probation-violation
adjudications. Furthermore, the defendant's attorney was not in-
effective because the defendant was not prejudiced when his attor-
ney failed to inform him of his right to appeal.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1991, the defendant Claude E. Hampton ("Hampton") was
convicted of assault with intent to commit first-degree sexual as-
sault, which resulted in a fifteen year suspended sentence and fif-
teen years probation.' In August 1992 Hampton was arrested and
charged with first-degree sexual assault after a brutal attack on a
woman in Newport. 2 At the defendant's probation-violation hear-
ing, Hampton's attorney attempted to persuade the judge to hold
off lifting the suspended sentence until the underlying criminal
charges were resolved. Hampton's attorney believed that the lack
of evidence in the underlying charge would be a mitigating factor
in determining the length of the suspended sentence that Hampton
would have to serve.3 Hampton's attorney failed in this attempt
and the hearing justice found that Hampton had violated his terms
of probation and ordered him to serve the fifteen years of his previ-
ous suspended sentence. 4 At no time during the hearing did
Hampton's attorney or the hearing justice inform him of his right
to appeal the probation-violation adjudication.5 Hampton was
never indicted on the first-degree sexual assault charge.6
Six years later the defendant sought to vacate the finding of a
probation violation and the fifteen year sentence on the grounds
that he was deprived of both due process and effective assistance of
counsel because the hearing justice and his attorney failed to ad-
vise him of his right to appeal pursuant to Rule 32(a)(2) of the Su-
1. Hampton v. State, 786 A.2d 375, 378 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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perior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.7 The post conviction
relief ("PCR") hearing justice held that the probation-violation jus-
tice had no obligation to inform Hampton of his right to appeal
under Rule 32(a)(2), because the rights described in that rule do
not apply to probation-revocation hearings.8 The PCR hearing jus-
tice also rejected Hampton's ineffective assistance of counsel claim
because the attorney did not have a duty to inform his client of the
right to appeal the probation-violation adjudicationf Further-
more, the PCR hearing justice was unable to reduce Hampton's
sentence because he failed to request such reduction within 120
days of imposition as required by Rule 35 of the Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 10 Hampton appealed from the PCR
ruling."
BACKGROUND
Rule 32(a)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure states that after imposing sentence in a case, which has gone
to trial on a plea of not guilty, the court shall advise the defendant
of his or her right to appeal.12 In addition, Rule 32(f) of the Supe-
rior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure states that the court shall
not revoke probation or revoke a suspension of sentence or impose
a sentence previously deferred except after a hearing at which the
defendant shall be afforded the opportunity to be present and ap-
prised of the grounds on which such action is proposed. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court conducted a de novo review
of this case because the defendant alleged constitutional viola-
tions. 14 The court held that a probation-violation hearing is not
part of the criminal-prosecution process, and is instead civil in na-
ture. Thus, all the rights that are normally guaranteed to defend-
7. Id. (citing R.I. Superior Ct. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(2)).
8. Id. at 378.
9. Id. at 379.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. R.I. Superior Ct. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(2).
13. R.I. Superior Ct. R. Crim. P. 32(D.
14. Hampton, 786 A.2d at 379 (citing Carillo v. State, 773 A.2d 248, 252 (R.I.
2001)).
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ants in a criminal case do not apply. 15 To establish a probation
violation, Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure only requires a showing that the defendant failed to keep the
peace and remain on good behavior.' 6 Furthermore, the state's
burden of proof is only to adduce reasonably satisfactory evidence
of the defendant's violation of one of the terms of his probation, not
evidence establishing a violation beyond a reasonable doubt.17
Also, it is not the hearing justice's duty to determine the defen-
dant's criminal guilt for any of the conduct triggering the
violation.' 8
Because a probation-violation hearing is not a criminal pro-
ceeding the court held that the rights under Rule 32(a)(2) of the
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure are not applicable. 19
Hampton argued that although Rule 32(f) does not specifically pro-
vide for notification to the accused of his or her right to appeal from
a probation-violation adjudication, the rule should be interpreted
to afford a defendant minimal due process. 20 Hampton cited State
v. Lawrence,2 ' where the defendant was held without bail for over
ten days while awaiting a probation-violation hearing, violating a
statute instituting a 10-day maximum. In that case the court held
that the 10-day maximum was clearly within the legislative intent
as a requirement of minimum due process. 22 However, in the case
at bar there was no statutory violation; therefore the court rejected
Hampton's argument that notice of appeal from probation-viola-
tion hearings should be a minimal due process right. 23 Further-
more, the court asserted that because a probation-violation
hearing is not a criminal proceeding a defendant is not afforded the
same due process guarantees.24 Finally, the court held that the
United States Constitution does not provide any such guarantee. 25
Regarding the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, the court held that in Rhode Island, a defendant who is
15. Id. (citing State v. Znosko, 755 A.2d 832, 834 (R.I. 2000)).
16. Id. (citing State v. Gautier, 774 A.2d 882, 887 (R.I. 2001)).
17. Id. (citing State v. Kennedy, 702 A.2d 28, 31 (R.I. 1997)).
18. Id. at 380 (citing Gautier, 774 A.2d at 887).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 658 A.2d 890, 892 (R.I. 1995); see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-9 (2001).
22. Hampton, 786 A.2d at 380 (citing Lawrence, 658 A.2d at 892).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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faced with the possible loss of liberty after a probation-violation
hearing at which the court may order him or her to serve all or a
portion of a previously suspended sentence, has the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel with respect to this hearing.26 In deter-
mining whether there is ineffective assistance of counsel the
United States Supreme Court established a two-prong test.27
First, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance
was deficient to the point that it "so undermined the proper func-
tioning of the adversarial process that the hearing cannot be relied
on as having provided a just result."28 Second, that defendant
must show that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial to
the defense and that counsel's errors were so serious that the de-
fendant was deprived of a fair hearing.29
The court applied this test to the facts of the case at bar and
held that Hampton was not deprived of his right to effective assis-
tance of counsel. 30 Regarding the first prong, the court was not
convinced that, in light of the circumstances of the case, failure to
disclose the right to appeal was so deficient as to deprive the su-
preme court of any confidence in the justice of the probation-viola-
tion hearing and his decision.31 However, the court noted that
even if this first prong was satisfied, Hampton did not prove the
second prong.32 Hampton did not demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by the attorney's actions in failing to notify him of a
right to appeal.33 The court held that even if the probation-viola-
tion hearing justice agreed to delay sentence, the outcome of the
hearing would have been the same. 34 The lack of indictment on
the underlying wrongdoing was not relevant to the applicant's cul-
pability as a probation violator and it would not affect the amount
of the suspended sentence that the defendant would be required to
26. Id. (citing State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377, 1379 (R.I. 1996) (citing O'Neill
v. Sharkley, 268 A.2d 720, 722 (R.I. 1970))). However, this guarantee is not recog-
nized on the federal level. Id.
27. Id. at 381 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
28. Id. (citing Toole v. State, 748 A.2d 806, 809 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Tarvis v.
Moran, 551 A.2d 699, 700 (R.I. 1988))).
29. Id. (citing Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 16, 174 (R.I. 2001)).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 382.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
serve.35 The court found that this was most likely the reason why
the delay was denied.36 Furthermore, the court noted that it was
not unreasonable for Hampton's attorney to be primarily con-
cerned about his client facing a potential felony indictment and
subsequent criminal trial, and that the failure to indict was not an
occurrence that Hampton's lawyer was bound to have antici-
pated.3 7 Finally, the court held that the defendant could still seek
relief by petitioning the supreme court for a writ of common-law
certiorari. 38 In addition, Hampton failed to advance any argu-
ments that might have been successful in reducing his sentence.3 9
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's
judgment holding that the hearing justice did not violate Hamp-
ton's right to due process by failing to notify him of his right to
appeal from the order finding him to be a probation violator. Fur-
thermore, Hampton was not the victim of ineffective assistance of
counsel at the violation hearing when his counsel failed to inform
him of a right to appeal because the defendant was not prejudiced.
Camille A. McKenna
35. Id. at 383.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 382-83.
38. Id. at 383.
39. Id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Contreras-Cruz, 765 A.2d 849 (R.I. 2001).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a victim's bedroom
was a "dwelling" within the meaning of the law of burglary because
it had a lock on the door, and defendant can be convicted of bur-
glary after breaking and entering such private dwelling room with-
out permission, despite having permission to enter the home.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On October 23, 1993, a young woman (Tess) accompanied her
boyfriend (Eddie), defendant, who is also Eddie's half-brother (de-
fendant), and several friends on a night of football games, fast-food
restaurants, and parties.' Tess had been drinking throughout the
evening, ultimately succumbing to vomiting, extreme intoxication,
and unconsciousness in the back of the car in which she was rid-
ing.2 Defendant was aware that Tess was inebriated, having spo-
ken with her through the night and witnessing her illness. 3 On
one occasion he had expressed an interest in leaving the party
alone with Tess. 4 While Tess was still in this drunken state, Eddie
drove her home, carried her to her room, and put her to bed before
returning to the party.5 Eddie and Tess occupied a bedroom in this
Coventry, Rhode Island home, in the context of an intimate rela-
tionship. This room was on the first floor of his mother's home,
where other siblings also lived; the defendant did not reside here.6
After spending time back at the party, Eddie returned home, be-
lieving Tess would be alone in her room asleep as he had left her.7
He was alarmed to find the door to their bedroom bolted from the
inside. By Tess' account, she was awakened by a banging on the
door and Eddie calling her name from outside the locked door.)
She found defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with her as she
came to and realized what was happening. 9 Eddie beat down the
door and struggled with defendant before defendant exited
1. State v. Contreras-Cruz, 765 A.2d 849, 850 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 850-51.
4. Id. at 851.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 850.
7. Id. at 851.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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through the window and escaped. 10 Tess denied letting defendant
into the room or ever consenting to his acts."
Eddie's testimony confirmed that of Tess', adding that defen-
dant left the party just prior to the sexual assault with an indica-
tion that he wished to be alone. 12 Eddie also testified that
defendant generally had permission to go to their home, but that
Eddie's mother did not want him around.' 3
Throughout the trial for burglary and first-degree sexual as-
sault, defendant moved various times for acquittal or dismissal of
the charges. 14 First, following the presentation of the state's case,
defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal.' 5 Before presenta-
tion of the defendant's case, defendant moved to dismiss the sexual
assault on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional.' 6
These motions were denied. After defendant's case was argued, he
again moved for a judgment of acquittal. 17 At this point, the trial
justice denied the motion with respect to sexual assault but re-
served ruling on the burglary count until after the jury's verdict.' 8
The jury returned a guilty verdict on both charges. The trial jus-
tice then denied the motion for judgment of acquittal on the bur-
glary count.19 Defendant's motion for a new trial was also
denied. 20 Defendant was sentenced to forty years, with fifteen
years to serve and twenty-five years suspended on each of the sex-
ual assault and burglary convictions, both to be served
concurrently. 21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, defendant first argued that the trial justice erred
in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the burglary
charge. 22 He argued that the prosecution failed to present legally
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 855-56.
14. Id. at 851-52.
15. Id. at 851.
16. Id. (arguing that R. I. Gen. Law § 11-37-2 (1) (2000) was unconstitutional).
17. Id. at 852.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he
entered Tess' dwelling place with the intent of sexually assaulting
her, and that any inference of felonious intent was impermissibly
speculative. 23 In rejecting this argument and upholding the denial
of the motion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court applied the same
standard that the trial justice uses in considering a motion for
judgment of acquittal.24 Therefore, the court viewed the evidence
in the light most favorable to the state, without weighing the evi-
dence or assessing credibility of witnesses, but giving full credibil-
ity to the state's witnesses, and drawing all reasonable inferences
consistent with guilt. If the totality of the evidence and reasonable
inferences therefrom would justify a reasonable juror in finding de-
fendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the lower court's denial
of such a motion must be upheld, as it was here. 25
After the court applied the definition of burglary26 to the facts
of this case, it found that the evidence was clear that defendant
was aware of Tess' intoxication, was intent on sexually assaulting
her, and that Tess in no way gave her consent to entry or to sexual
intercourse.27 A reasonable juror might infer this from the evi-
dence. Despite defendant's contentions that the evidence of intent
was too weak to support a conviction, the court found sufficient
evidence that defendant had the requisite mental state at the criti-
cal time of breaking and entering and that the evidence was com-
pelling.2 The court discounted defendant's allegations that a
finding of guilt would constitute an impermissible pyramiding of
inferences. 29 In fact no "pyramid" existed at all here; felonious in-
23. Id.
24. Id. at 852 (citing State v. Snow, 670 A.2d 239, 243 (R.I. 1996)).
25. Id. (using the same reasoning to uphold the trial justice's denial of defen-
dant's motion for acquittal on the sexual assault count) Id. at 856.
26. Id. (citing State v. O'Rourke, 399 A.2d 1237, 1238 (1979) (stating that the
crime of burglary in violation of R.I. Gen. Law § 11-8-1 (2000) incorporates the
common law definition of the crime); State v. Hudson, 165 A. 649, 50 (R.I. 1933)
(defining burglary at common law as "the breaking and entering the dwelling-
house of another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony therein,
whether the felony be actually committed or not.")).
27. Id. at 852-53.
28. The court distinguished the facts of this case with those defendant cited to
support his position: State v. Moran, 699 A.2d 20 (R.L 1997); State v. Williams,
461 A.2d 385 (R.I. 1983); State v. Woods, 821 P.2d 1235 (1991).
29. The use of pyramiding of inferences was present in the following cases:
State v. Dame, 560 A.2d 330, 334 (R.I. 1989); In re Derek, 448 A.2d 765, 768 (R.I.
1982); State v. Alexander, 471 A.2d 216, 218 (R.I. 1984).
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tent could be inferred from unambiguous facts capable of providing
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.30
Next, defendant claimed that the trial justice erred in denying
his motion for judgment of acquittal because he did not violate the
scope of his permission to enter the house and because he could not
be convicted of burglary since Tess' room was not a "dwelling
house."3 1 This argument failed. The court noted that while one
may have permission to enter parts of a dwelling, entry into a room
within that dwelling that a person does not have permission to
enter can constitute burglary. 32 Several courts have held that a
room within a house can constitute a "dwelling house" for the pur-
poses of a burglary prosecution.33 Additionally, this court previ-
ously has held a dormitory room to be an "apartment" within the
meaning of a burglary statute similar to the one at issue in this
case, G.L.1956 § 11-8-3. 34 The policy behind such findings evi-
dences recognition that there are often several dwelling houses, or
places of abode, under the same roof and that everyone should be
afforded some degree of security in their abode no matter the un-
conventional nature of the layout.3 5 The court found that Tess'
bedroom was a "dwelling" within the law of burglary and that this
law protects not only the house but the private quarters of each
person living there.36 Evidence that Tess' bedroom door had a lock
on the knob and a dead-bolt lock afforded this room the same level
of security and protection as a dormitory room or a private
apartment.37
Defendant's third contention on appeal was that the trial jus-
tice erred in permitting hearsay testimony to establish that he did
not have permission to enter the premises at the time of the
30. Contreras-Cruz, 765 A.2d at 852.
31. Id. at 853.
32. Id. at 854 (citing United State v. Bowen, 24 F.Cas. 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1835)
(No. 14, 629)).
33. See State v. Descant, 42 So. 486, 488 (La. 1906).
34. See State v. Riely, 523 A.2d 1225 (R.I. 1987).
35. Contreras-Cruz, 765 A.2d at 854-55 (citing Riely, 523 A.2d at 1226). The
same policy was demonstrated recently in State v. Turner, 746 A.2d 700, 703 (R.I.
2000) (finding that a private apartment of an on-site manager within a bed-and
breakfast was a 'dwelling house' within the meaning of R. I. Gen. Law § 11-8-2(a)
(1956)).
36. Id. at 854-55.
37. Id. at 855.
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crime.38 Additionally defendant argued that this hearsay was
prejudicial in showing him to be a "bad guy."39 At trial, Eddie had
been allowed to testify that his mother didn't want the defendant
around their house.40 The court defended the admissibility of such
testimony, finding it to fall under R.I. R. Evid. Rule 803(3), the
"[then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition" excep-
tion to the hearsay rule in which the statement is not excluded
under particular circumstances, even when the declarant is availa-
ble.4 1 Here, Eddie described his mother's "state of mind" concern-
ing the scope of defendant's permission to enter the house.42 The
statement was not highly prejudicial because there was ample
other evidence to draw the conclusion that defendant was a "bad
guy."43 Also, R.I. R. Evid. 404(a) only limits evidence offered to
show action in conformity with character or a particular trait, how-
ever this evidence was offered for the purpose of demonstrating the
scope of defendant's permission to enter the house. 44
Defendant's fourth argument attacked the denied motions at
trial on the sexual assault charge.4 5 Defendant argued that Tess
was not "physically helpless" at the time of penetration, and that
she consented to sexual intercourse under the mistaken belief that
defendant was her boyfriend.4 6 He believed this would place him
in jeopardy of a crime of sexual assault by concealment, but not
first-degree sexual assault as charged. These arguments failed. 47
With respect to defendant's new trial motion, the court noted that
the trial justice must exercise independent judgment to decide
whether the evidence from trial is sufficient for the jury to con-
clude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.48 The supreme court will
38. Id. at 855-56.
39. Id. at 855.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 856. R.I. R. Evid. 803(3) allows a statement if it is a "statement of
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condi-
tion (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health),
but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed .... " Id.
42. Id. at 855-56.
43. Id. at 856.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 856-57 (writing that according to Snow, 670 A.2d at 243, the trial
justice has at least three analyses to perform when ruling on a motion for a new
SURVEY SECTION
reverse the ruling on the motion only if it finds that the trial jus-
tice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise
clearly wrong.49 After looking at the definition of "physically help-
less" within the context of the charge against defendant as a viola-
tion of section 11-37-2 and section 11-37-3, the court found that the
trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence. 50
The trial justice made clear that Tess' state of mind was a question
of fact on which the jury could find that Tess was asleep and thus
physically helpless during intercourse. 51
Lastly, defendant claimed that the trial justice erred in re-
stricting his cross-examination of Tess. 52 By precluding defense
counsel from questioning Tess about her boyfriend's affair with an-
other woman, defendant claims that the trial justice quashed any
chance of establishing that she consented to sex for purposes of
revenge.53 The court found that the trial justice did not abuse his
discretion under the circumstances of this case that showed Tess
too drunk to carry out such a scheme.54 Limiting the extent and
scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the
trial justice and will be left undisturbed absent a showing of abuse
of discretion.5 5 Defendant's efforts here failed.
CONCLUSION
An appeal of a first-degree sexual assault and burglary convic-
tion was dismissed and judgment was affirmed. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to uphold a
finding that defendant entered victim's home with the intent of
sexually assaulting her, as necessary for a burglary conviction.
Victim's bedroom was a "dwelling" within the meaning of the law
of burglary and permission to enter the home did not extend to a
trial .... First, the trial justice must consider the evidence in light of the charge to
the jury; second, the trial justice must determine his or her own opinion of the
evidence; third, the trial justice must determine whether he or she would have
reached a different result from that of the jury.').
49. Id. at 856 (citing State v. Scurry, 636 A.2d 719, 725 (R.I. 1994)).
50. Id. Section 11-37-1(6) defines "physically helpless" as "a person who is un-
conscious, asleep, or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate un-
willingness to an act." Id.
51. Id. at 857.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing State v. Veluzat, 578 A.2d 93, 95 (R.I. 1990)).
20021
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private room capable of being locked. The trial judge properly al-
lowed hearsay evidence based upon a "state of mind" exception,
and used sound discretion to limit cross-examination. Based upon
clear and ample evidence, defendant was not entitled to a judg-
ment of acquittal or a new trial on either charge against him.
Christy Hetherington
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Criminal Law. State v. Gomes, 764 A.2d 125 (R.I. 2001). Reliable
hearsay may be used to established reasonable suspicion or proba-
ble cause. A sufficient match between an individual and a descrip-
tion of a suspect broadcast over police radio provides reasonable
suspicion. A trial judge has discretion to admit evidence under
Rule 404(b) and leading questions.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
At approximately 1 a.m., on November 25, 1997, Robert Wray
(Wray), was shot and killed on the doorstep of his mother's apart-
ment in Providence, Rhode Island.' Shortly before Wray was
killed, Wray and his friend, Tavell Yon (Yon) were watching televi-
sion in the living room when someone knocked on the rear door of
the apartment.2 Yon answered the door and encountered a man
whom he had never seen before.3 The man asked to speak with
Wray.4 Yon called Wray to the door and then returned to the liv-
ing room. From the living room, Yon overheard the man ask for
"Frankie."5 Wray replied: "you know who I am, I'm Frankie's
cousin."6 Wray then told the man that Frankie was not there, and
the man left.7
Several minutes later, Yon answered another knock at the
door.8 Yon observed that it was the same man that was at the door
minutes earlier. 9 This time the man asked to speak with Wray. 10
Again, Yon called Wray to the door and went back inside the apart-
ment." Within seconds, Yon heard a gunshot, looked over to the
doorway and saw Wray lying on the ground. 12 Wray's younger
brother, who was also in the apartment at the time, called 911.13
When the police arrived, Yon explained what had happened and
described the man at the door as: "a short black male with Jerry
1. State v. Gomes, 764 A.2d 125, 129 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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curls and a moustache."14 He had craters and pimples in his face
and he was wearing a black leather jacket."15 This description,
along with a warning that the suspect could be armed and danger-
ous, was immediately transmitted over the police broadcast
system.16
Hearing the broadcast, Patrolman Jose Deschamps (Officer
Deschamps), responded to the scene of the murder.17 After assist-
ing in securing the crime scene, Officer Deschamps proceeded to
search for the suspect.' 8 Approximately ten to fifteen minutes af-
ter the shooting, Officer Deschamps went to a nearby convenience
store to alert the employees that a murder had just been commit-
ted and that the suspect was at large and believed to be danger-
ous. 19 As Officer Deschamps entered the store, he noticed a man
using a pay phone outside the store but could not see his face.20 As
he left the store, Officer Deschamps noticed the same man still us-
ing the phone.21 This time, however, he looked more closely and
was able to see the man's face. 22 He observed the man to be a
black male, five foot four to five foot six inches in height, with a
"crater face, or pimples," and "slicked, very greasy" hair with
"Jerry curls."23 He also observed that the man appeared nervous
and, despite the cold weather, was sweating and not wearing a
jacket.24
Comparing the police broadcast with his observation of the
man using the phone, Officer Deschamps' suspicions were
aroused. 25 He then approached the man and began asking rapid
questions about the man's identity and what he was doing out so
late.26 As Officer Deschamps was asking the questions, the man
appeared to become more nervous and began stuttering and mum-
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 129-30.
20. Id. at 130.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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bled his words while attempting to answer. 27 Officer Deschamps
attempted to place his right hand on the man's left shoulder to ini-
tiate a protective pat-down search for weapons.28 At that point,
the man jerked back and Officer Deschamps' arm accidentally slid
down the man's side.29 Believing that he had felt a gun, Officer
Deschamps lifted the man's shirt and observed a loaded 9-millime-
ter pistol in the man's waistbandY° Officer Deschamps immedi-
ately pulled out the pistol and observed it to be cocked and ready to
fire.31 He then placed the gun on the ground, secured it with his
foot, and radioed for assistance in placing the man under arrest.
32
Patrolman Charles Matracia (Officer Matracia), who had just
left the murder scene and was driving Wray to the Providence po-
lice headquarters to be interviewed, heard Officer Deschamps' call
for assistance. 33 Within seconds, Officer Matracia and Wray ar-
rived at the scene where Officer Deschamps was detaining the
man.3 4 Upon seeing the man, Yon exclaimed: "that's him right
there" and, he "was the guy that came to the door."35 The man,
later identified as Gomes, was placed under arrest. Shortly there-
after, Yon was interviewed and reiterated that Gomes was the man
that had come to the door.36
After a jury trial, Marc Gomes (Gomes), was convicted of first-
degree murder and one count of carrying a pistol without a li-
cense. 37 Gomes claimed that the trial judge made various eviden-
tiary and constitutional errors by admitting certain pieces of
evidence at his trial and appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court seeking reversal of his convictions and a new trial.38
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 130-31.
37. Id. at 128-29.
38. Id. at 129.
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ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
The Police Broadcast
Gomes argued that Yan's description of the murder suspect
given to Officer Calabro and broadcast over the police radio was
hearsay and its admission into evidence at his trial constituted
prejudicial error.39 The court rejected Gomes' argument for two
reasons.40 First, the description of the suspect was not hearsay
because it was used to show why Officer Deschamps apprehended
Gomes rather than to prove Gomes' guilt.4 1 Reliable hearsay may
be used to establish probable cause to arrest or secure a warrant. 42
Thus, the proper inquiry for the court was whether the description
was sufficiently reliable when relayed by Officer Calabro to Of-
ficers Deschamps and Matracia. 43 In its silence on the issue, the
court presumably held that the description was sufficiently
reliable.
Second, Rule 801(d)(1) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence
provides that out-of-court statements are not hearsay "if the de-
clarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-exam-
ination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (C) one
of identification of a person made after perceiving the declarant."44
Yon, the declarant, gave his description of the suspect within min-
utes of the shooting.45 He testified under oath and was subject to
cross-examination and confirmed the accuracy of the description
that was broadcast by Officer Calabro. 46 Accordingly, Yon's state-
ment fell within the purview of Rule 801(d)(1) and was not
hearsay. 47
The Seizure of the Gun
Gomes also argued that that Officer Deschamps lacked rea-
sonable suspicion to approach and detain him outside the conve-
39. Id. at 131.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 131-32.
44. Id. at 131 (quoting R.I. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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nience store.48 He further argued that Officer Deschamps had no
right to conduct a pat-down search before arresting him and that
there was no probable cause later to arrest him.49 Accordingly,
Gomes argued that the trial justice erred in allowing Officer Des-
champs to testify to the gun seized form Gomes' waistband.50
A police officer may conduct an investigatory stop of an indi-
vidual if specific articulable facts would lead reasonable officer to
suspect that the individual is engaged in criminal activity.51 An
officer acting with reasonable suspicion may conduct such a stop to
investigate either completed or ongoing crimes. 52 Relevant to the
reasonable suspicion inquiry are the time and location at which the
suspicious conduct occurred, the suspicious conduct or appearance
of the suspect and the personal knowledge or experience of the de-
taining officer. 53 To establish reasonable suspicion, an officer com-
paring an individual to a description of a suspect, may take into
consideration a change in circumstances or a suspect's attempt to
conceal his identity.5 4 '"An investigatory stop differs from a full
arrest and search both in the duration of the detention and in the
quantum of suspicion necessary to conduct it." 55 During an inves-
tigatory stop of an individual whom the officer reasonably believes
is armed and dangerous to the officer or others, the officer may
conduct a limited, self-protective patdown search of the suspect's
outer clothing.56
Officer Deschamps' actions at the convenience store were
proper in light of the information available to him.57 Although
Gomes was not wearing a jacket as the subject had been described,
Gomes otherwise perfectly matched the description of the suspect
that was broadcast over the police radio. When Gomes was ques-
tioned by Officer Deschamps, he became nervous and began stut-
tering and mumbling.58 The court held that those facts provided
48. Id.
49. Id. at 132.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 133 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227 (1985)).
53. Id. (citing State v. Abdullah, 730 A.2d 1074, 1077 (R.I. 1999)).
54. Id. at 132 at n.2 (citing State v. Clark, 721 So.2d 1202, 1205 n.2 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998)).
55. Id. (quoting In re John N., 463 A.2d 174, 176 (R.I. 1983)).
56. Id. at 133 (quoting State v. Black, 721 A.2d 826, 829-30 (R.I. 1998)).
57. Id. at 133-34.
58. Id. at 133.
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not only reasonable suspicion to detain Gomes, but also probable
cause to arrest and, incidental to that arrest, search him.59 Thus,
Officer Deschamps' testimony regarding the seizure of the gun was
proper.60
Opinion Evidence
Gomes also argued that the trial judge improperly allowed ex-
pert testimony to establish his guilt at trial.6 1 At trial, Officer
Robert Badessa testified about his investigation of the crime scene
and his collection and documentation of evidence. 62 Specifically,
Officer Badessa testified as an expert regarding the dissipation of
gunshot residue found on certain articles of clothing.6 3 For the
first time on appeal, Gomes argued that Officer Badessa was not
qualified to offer expert testimony in this area. Because Gomes
never raised this argument at trial, court considered that argu-
ment waived. 64
Even if Gomes had raised that issue at trial, the decision to
qualify an individual as an expert is soundly in the trial justice's
discretion.65 Officer Badessa had been a member of the Providence
Police Department for twenty-five years, and of that, he had spent
the previous seven years with the BCI unit.66 He had handled ap-
proximately thirty homicides.67 He had received training regard-
ing bullet holes and impact. He had experience testing gunshot
residue on clothing.68 With this experience, the trial justice would
not have abused his discretion by admitting the evidence.69 Fur-
ther, even if the admission of Officer Badessa's testimony had been
error, it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because an-
other well-regarded expert had testified without objection about
the same opinion evidence. 70
59. Id. at 134.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 135.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Rule 404(b) Challenge
Gomes also argued that the trial judge allowed the state to use
improper character evidence to obtain his conviction. 71 At trial, a
former prison cellmate of Gomes', Ralph Mosley (Mosley), testified
that Gomes had referred to his cousins as good "boosters."72
Thereafter, over Gomes' objection, Mosley defined the term
"booster" to mean "thief."73 Gomes argued that such testimony
was both prejudicial and irrelevant and should have been excluded
pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Ruled of Evidence. 74
Rule 404(b) excludes evidence of prior criminal acts only if such
evidence is both prejudicial and irrelevant 75
Questions of relevance, including whether probative value is
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, are left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge.76 Trial judge's relevancy determina-
tions will not be disturbed unless that determination was an abuse
of discretion and the admission of the irrelevant information was
prejudicial to the defendant's rights.77 When considering whether
a remark is prejudicial, the judge must evaluate the potential
prejudice of the remark on the outcome of the case by examining
the statement in its factual context.78 Prejudice exists when a re-
mark so enflames the passions of the jury as to prevent their calm
dispassionate examination of the evidence. 79 To show prejudice,
there must exist a reasonable probability that the improper evi-
dence contributed to a defendant's conviction.80 To determine
whether a reasonable probability exists, a reviewing court must
decide what probable impact the improper evidence would have
had on an average jury.8 1 The admission of prejudicial evidence is
harmless if it is not reasonably possible that such evidence would
influence an average jury on the ultimate issue of guilt or inno-
71. Id. at 136.
72. Id. at 135-36.
73. Id. at 136.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I. 2000)).
76. Id. (quoting Garcia, 743 A.2d at 1050, quoting State v. Gordon, 508 A.2d
1339, 1347 (R.I. 1986)).
77. Id. (quoting State v. Robertson, 740 A.2d 330, 345 (R.I. 1999)).
78. Id. (quoting State v. Fernandez, 526 A.2d 495, 498 (R.I.1987)).
79. Id. (quoting Fernandez, 526 A.2d at 498 (quoting State v. Brown, 522 A.2d
208, 211 (R.I. 1987))).
80. Id. (quoting Robertson, 740 A.2d at 336).
81. Id. (quoting Robertson, 740 A.2d at 336).
2002]
450 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:403
cence.82 The admission of impermissible evidence need not be prej-
udicial in a case in which there is independent overwhelming
evidence of a defendant's guilt.8 3
The court held that Mosley's reference to the words "booster"
and "thief' were neither irrelevant nor prejudicial.8 4 The trial
judge's finding of relevance was not an abuse of discretion because
the term "boosters" had already been put before the jury without
objection and an explanation of the term would assist the jury.85
Further, Mosley's testimony prejudice Gomes' rights for two rea-
sons.8 6 First, Mosley's testimony referred to Gomes' cousins rather
than Gomes.8 7 Therefore, the challenged testimony did not con-
tribute to Gomes' convictions.88 Secondly, an eyewitness had iden-
tified Gomes as being at the scene of the murder seconds before the
gunshots; within ten to fifteen minutes of the murder and within
only a few blocks of the scene, the defendant was found in posses-
sion of the murder weapon; and, the defendant had confessed that
Wray's murder was a "sanctioned hit" and that he went to the door
to draw the victim out of the house.8 9 Consequently, in light of the
overwhelming evidence of Gomes' guilt, even if it was error to ad-
mit Mosley's challenged testimony, such error was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.90
Leading Questions
Finally, Gomes argued that the trial justice erred by admitting
leading questions over his objection during the State's redirect of
Mosley. 91 Leading questions are generally prohibited on direct ex-
aminations. 92 However, the trial justice has considerable latitude
in ruling on objections to leading questions. 93 Such ruling will be
overturned upon an abuse of discretion or substantial injury to de-
82. Id. at 136-37 (quoting State v. Burns, 524 A.2d 564, 568 (R.I. 1987) (quot-
ing State v. Poulin, 415 A.2d 1307 1311 (R.I. 1980))).
83. Id. at 137 (citing Robertson, 740 A.2d at 337).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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fendant.94 While the State's questions were leading and improper,
they merely elicited facts that had already been put in evidence
during Mosley's direct examination. 95 Therefore, Gomes was not
injured by the leading questions.96
CONCLUSION
In State v. Gomes, the defendant was denied neither constitu-
tional nor statutory rights at trial. Reasonable suspicion may be
based on reliable hearsay or a sufficient match between an individ-
ual and a suspect's description broadcast over police radio. Fur-
thermore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion is allowing
certain evidence in or in permitting leading questions. Accord-
ingly, Gomes' appeal was denied and his conviction affirmed.
Michael J. Daly
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Criminal Law. State v. O'Brien, 774 A.2d 89 (R.I. 2001). The au-
dio portion of a videotape recorder is "an intercepting device"
under statute prohibiting willful interception of wire or oral com-
munications. Jury instructions are not improper when the jury
finds facts that are so closely related to the omitted element that
no rational jury could find those facts without also finding the
omitted element. This exercise amounts to the functional
equivalent of the omitted element. Therefore, the trial justice's
failure to define for the jury the term "intercept" is not reversible
error.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
During the early morning of May 11, 1996, defendant, Jeffrey
O'Brien, invited codefendant and fraternity brother Jordan Smith
to videotape O'Brien and his girlfriend (hereinafter, the victim)
having sex at the Alpha Epsilon Pi fraternity house at the Univer-
sity of Rhode Island.' O'Brien instructed Smith to borrow a video
camera and then wait in his bedroom closet.2 Smith waited in the
closet for approximately a half hour until defendant reentered his
room with his unsuspecting victim. 3 Smith activated the camera
when the couple moved from defendant's couch onto the bed and
began removing their clothing.4 At some point during the love-
making, the victim suddenly observed "a camera lens coming from
[the] closet" and a "bluish light coming from the camera itself."5
The victim screamed, "Oh, my God, somebody is taping us!" and
the defendant tried to calm her down by saying that she was seeing
things.6 The victim pulled the curtain open revealing Smith squat-
ting on a chair with the video camera in his hand.7 Smith and the
victim struggled for possession of the camera and she ultimately
gained control of it.s The defendant denied having any prior
knowledge of the videotaping. 9 Smith made several attempts to
1. State v. O'Brien, 774 A.2d 89, 92 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 93.
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retrieve and destroy the tape, but these efforts were thwarted by
the heroic efforts of the victim.' 0
Both defendant and Smith were indicted for conspiring to un-
lawfully intercept an oral communication and for intercepting an
oral communication." Smith pled nolo contendere to the charges
in the indictment and received an eighteen-month suspended sen-
tence and probation. 12 The defendant, however, opted for a trial
and was found guilty on both of the counts charged in the indict-
ment.'3 The defendant was sentenced to a five-year suspended
sentence with a concurrent probationary term.' 4 The defendant
then filed this appeal. 15
BACKGROUND
In order to convict a defendant under the state's wiretapping
statute, section 11-35-21, the state must prove that the defendant
wilfully intercepted, attempted to intercept, or procured any other
person to intercept or attempt to intercept, any wire or oral com-
munication.16 Section 12-5.1-1(5) of the Rhode Island General
Laws defines the term "intercept" to mean "to acquire aurally the
contents of any wire or oral communications through the use of any
intercepting device."' 7 Section 12-5.1-1(6) defines an "intercepting
device" as "any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept
wire or oral communications." Section 12-5.1-1(8) defines "oral
communications" as "any oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject
to interception under circumstances justifying [such]
expectation."18
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, defendant argued that the mere surreptitious re-
cording of private oral communications does not constitute an "in-
terception of a communication" under the Rhode Island's
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 94.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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wiretapping statute.19 The defendant argued that the audio re-
corder built into the video camera that Smith used was not an "in-
tercepting device" as defined by section 12-5.1-1(5).20 Defendant
contended that because the audio recorder was integrated into the
video camera, it recorded only what already could be overheard by
the hidden cameraman's invited naked ear.21 Defendant further
contended that because that audio recorder did not amplify the re-
corded sounds to make them more audible, it cannot be considered
an "intercepting device."22 Lastly, Defendant claimed that the
trial justice erred by failing to instruct the jury that it had to find
that defendant had procured an interception of an oral communica-
tion through the use of an intercepting device. 23
In 1969, the Rhode Island General Assembly adopted the
broad language of the federal wiretapping statute and adopted it
as state law.24 The original version of the statute, which defen-
dant relies on for his argument, provided that "it shall not be un-
lawful for a party to any wire or oral communication or a person
given prior authority by a party to a communication to intercept
such communication."25 However, the amended statute, also
adopted by the Rhode Island General Assembly, renders illegal
one-party consensual recordings, like the one in this case, when
they are intercepted "for the purpose of committing any criminal or
tortuous act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States or of any State or for the purpose of committing any other
injurious act."26 By adopting the language of the federal statute,
the General Assembly appreciated the significant difference be-
tween a third party merely overhearing private communications
and the surreptitious tape recording of that same overheard con-
versation.2 7 The General Assembly apparently intended to protect
an individual's expectation of privacy, not only from the technologi-
cal innovations that increasingly expose our private communica-
tions to the uninvited bionic ear through the use of wiretapping,
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 96.
25. Id. at 94.
26. Id. at 95.
27. Id. at 96.
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sound amplifying, and bugging devices, but also from those unseen
devices such as tape recorders and other hidden transmitters. 28
Therefore, the defendant's first argument, that the mere surrepti-
tious recording of private oral communications does not constitute
an "interception of a communication" under the Rhode Island's
wiretapping statute, failed.
In deciding what constitutes an "intercepting device," the
Rhode Island Supreme Court construed the federal and state wire-
tapping statutes to include a tape recorder or other recording de-
vices.29 As a result, the audio portion of a video recorder is covered
by the scope of the federal and state wiretap statutes.30 The video
image captured by the surveillance camera is not what violates the
wiretap laws, rather it is the interception of an oral communication
that subjects the interceptor to liability.31 This broad interpreta-
tion of "intercepting device" gives effect to the General Assembly's
evident desire to protect individuals from "any device or appara-
tus" that might be used then or in the future to invade their
privacy. 32
The Rhode Island Supreme Court also did not find merit in
Defendant's argument that there was no "intercepting device" used
in this case because the "simple, unadulterated [video] camera"
used in this case was analogous to State v. Delaurier33 where an
"ordinary, unadulterated AM radio" was used by police to overhear
private cordless telephone conversations. 34 However, the De-
laurier court based its decision on an interpretation of the federal
wiretapping statute and not on Rhode Island's wiretapping statute
and its decision is therefore, not controlling in this case.36
Defendant next argued, without success, that the trial judge
committed reversible error by failing to include the statutory defi-
nitions of "intercept" and "intercepting device" in the jury instruc-
tions.36 Defendant claimed that the trial justice should have given
jury instructions defining the term "intercept" to mean "to acquire
28. Id.
29. Id. at 96-97.
30. Id. at 97.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 99.
33. 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985).
34. O'Brien, 774 A.2d at 99.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 100.
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aurally the contents of any wire or oral communication through the
use of any intercepting device."37 In this case, the trial justice read
the statute verbatim and attempted to summarize the elements in
his own words, a practice that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
has approved of for a long time.38 The trial judge also instructed
the jury that the defendant could not be convicted of this crime
unless there was an interception of an "oral communication."39
"When the jury finds facts that 'are so closely related' to the omit-
ted element 'that no rational jury could find those facts without
also finding the omitted element', this exercise amounts to the
functional equivalent of the omitted element."40 Therefore, the
trial justice's failure to define for the jury the term "intercept" is
not reversible error.
Similarly, the trial judge did not commit reversible error for
failing to define for the jury the term "intercepting device." The
trial justice ruled in limine that the video camera was an "inter-
cepting device" as a matter of law and its use indisputably "ac-
quire[d] aurally" the surrounding sounds and communications
captured on the videotape.41 Therefore, it was not necessary for
the trial judge to define the term "intercepting device" for the jury.
The defendant also contended that the court erred by permit-
ting the jury to view the videotape showing the sexual activity be-
tween the defendant and the victim because the videotape's
probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial value.42 How-
ever, the state had the burden under section 11-35-21(c)(3) of prov-
ing to the jury that the communications in question were
"intercepted for the purpose of committing [a]*** tortuous act."43
In this case, the tortuous act was the defendant's invasion of the
victim's privacy.44 Therefore, it was necessary for the jury to view
the videotape so that it could determine whether or not the defen-
dant had intercepted the communications between the victim and
37. Id. at 101.
38. Id. (citing State v. Durfee, 666 A.2d 407, 409 (R.I. 1995) (holding that
"'this court has long approved' of the practice by which a trial justice 'read[s] the
statute and *** attempt[s] to summarize the elements in his own words'")).
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing State v. Hazard, 745 A.2d 748, 753 (R.I. 2000)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 106.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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himself for the purpose of violating the victim's right to privacy.45
The court concluded that the defendant's remaining arguments
were without merit and affirmed the judgment of conviction.
CONCLUSION
In order to convict a defendant under the state's wiretapping
statute, the state must prove that the defendant wilfully inter-
cepted, attempted to intercept, or procured any other person to in-
tercept or attempt to intercept, any wire or oral communication
through the use of any intercepting device. The audio portion of a
video recorder is covered by the scope of the state wiretap statutes.
This broad interpretation of "intercepting device" gives effect to the
General Assembly's evident desire to protect individuals from "any
device or apparatus" that might be used then or in the future to
invade their privacy. The video image captured by the surveillance
camera is not what violates the wiretap laws, rather it is the inter-
ception of an oral communication that subjects the interceptor to
liability. In this case, the defendant was found guilty under the
state's wiretapping statute because his use of the video camera to
videotape a sexual encounter was as a wilful interception of an oral
communication through the use of an intercepting device that
caused the victim harm.
Mark P. Gagliardi
45. Id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913 (R.I. 2001). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held: (1) There was sufficient evi-
dence that defendant's oral, written, and taped statements to po-
lice were voluntary. (2) The record supported a sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. (3) The predicate
sentences for the imposition of the habitual criminal penalty must
occur sequentially, not on the same day as in the defendant's case;
thus the state failed to show that the defendant had two prior con-
victions and sentences that would qualify him for sentencing as a
habitual criminal.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On April 13, 1997 defendant Charles Smith was living in an
apartment in Newport with Margaret Rose Benard, their three-
year-old daughter, Samantha, and two of Benard's daughters from
a previous marriage, Kristen and Toni Jorge, sixteen and fourteen
years old, respectively.1 After an argument, Benard asked Smith
to leave and give her the keys.2 Defendant left, but returned at
approximately 5:00 a.m. the following morning to ask Benard for
cigarette money.3 She gave him two dollars and he left again.4
Sometime around 1:00 p.m. the same day, after Benard and the
children had gone out, defendant returned to the apartment via a
kitchen window to "change his clothing"; he reentered the apart-
ment shortly after 1:30,5 taking a knife from the kitchen. Shortly
thereafter Kristen returned to the apartment. 6 Defendant hid in a
bedroom until Kristen went out to walk the dog; he then attempted
to leave but was surprised by Kristen who had returned.7 She said
she was going to call the police on defendant; before she had a
chance, defendant grabbed her, dragged her into a bedroom, and
stabbed her to death.8 After he thought she was dead, he "'had sex
with her.'" 9
1. State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913, 915 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 916.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 917.
9. Id.
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Smith was convicted in Superior Court of first degree murder,
committed by means of torture and aggravated battery. His mo-
tion for a new trial was denied.' 0 He was sentenced to life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole, and also sentenced to a
consecutive fifteen-year sentence as a habitual offender."
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial justice erred by ad-
mitting statements he made to police; that because of mitigating
factors, the sentence of life imprisonment without parole was not
warranted; and that it was error to impose the habitual criminal
sentence upon him. 12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The court first addressed defendant's argument that his con-
stitutional right against self-incrimination was violated by the ad-
mission at trial of both his oral and written confessions to police. 13
The issue was raised for the first time on appeal, and no attempt
had been made by defendant to suppress this evidence at trial.14
The general rule is that the court will not consider issues not
raised at trial.15 However, under limited circumstances the court
will review issues concerning basic constitutional rights.' 6 Those
circumstances include, inter alia, whether the issue is "based upon
a novel rule of law, of which counsel could not reasonably have
known at the time of trial.'"'17 Here, the issue of whether or not a
confession had been made voluntarily is regularly considered in
other courts.' 8 Thus, defendant's counsel should have preserved
the issue below for appeal. 19 However, even if the issue had been
properly presented below, it would have been "wholly without
merit."20 "The impeccable conduct of the Newport officers, [includ-
ing proper reading and explanation of Miranda warnings] would
have precluded any finding of inadmissibility."21
10. Id. at 915.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 918.
13. Id. at 918-19.
14. Id. at 919.
15. Id. at 919 (quoting State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I.1987)).
16. Id. (citing Burke, 522 A.2d at 731).
17. Id. (quoting Burke, 522 A.2d at 731).
18. Id. (citations omitted).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 920 (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 (1986)).
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The court next addressed defendant's contention that the trial
justice erred in finding that none of the mitigating factors defen-
dant asserted outweighed the aggravating factors established by
the evidence and that a life sentence without the possibility of pa-
role was not warranted in this case.22 The mitigating factors de-
fendant asserted included an abusive father, absentee mother,
mental illness, defendant's failure to take his anti-psychotic medi-
cation, and that the murder was not premeditated.23 The court de-
fined first-degree murder as "'murder . . . perpetrated from a
premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect death of
any human being .... ,"24 The penalty for that crime is life impris-
onment.25 Additionally, "every person guilty of murder in the first
degree committed in a manner involving torture or an aggravated
battery'" shall be sentenced to life in prison without possibility of
parole. 26 Furthermore, the trial judge has discretion to weigh ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances when determining
whether to give a life sentence with or without possibility of pa-
role. 2 7 Moreover, the Rhode Island Supreme Court may ratify or
reduce the sentence imposed by the trial court 28 after exercising
their "'independent judgment in respect to the aggravating circum-
stances... together with any matter in mitigation.., including
personal history and character. 29 The court began its analysis by
quoting extensively from the record below: the trial justice
imagined the murder from the point of view of Kristen Jorge, and
the horror of her last few minutes; reviewed evidence that the de-
fendant had made statements weeks in advance about exactly how
he was going to kill Kristen Jorge; and a review of the defendant's
self-indulgent and parasitic existence. 30 "[Tihe murder of Kristen
Jorge was one of premeditated and unmitigated violence and bru-
tality."31 The trial justice found defendant's act of sexual inter-
course on his victim after she was dead "'disgustingly
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 921 (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 (2000)).
25. Id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 (2000)).
26. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 (2000)).
27. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19.2-1 (2000)).
28. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19.2-5 (1984)).
29. Id. (quoting State v. Travis, 568 A.2d 316, 325 (R.I.1990)).
30. Id. at 921-22.
31. Id. at 922.
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[reprehensible]... an act worthy only of the predatory vulture who
satisfies their [sic] needs by feeding on dead flesh. ' "32 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court found the evidence "overwhelmingly sup-
ports the finding that the murder was committed in a manner in-
volving torture and aggravated battery to the victim." 33 In
addition, the court found evidence of premeditation: defendant
"grabbed the large kitchen knife with which he would butcher
Kristen not when he saw Kristen in the apartment, but immedi-
ately upon entering the home; and that he "had told at least two
individuals, months prior to the murder, that he wanted to slice
Kristen's throat."34 The court held that "defendant's unfortunate
childhood" could not override the aggravating factors in the case
and it affirmed the lower court's imposition of life imprisonment
without parole. 35
Lastly, the court addressed defendant's contention that the
imposition of the habitual criminal sentence was error because the
predicate sentences had been imposed on the same day. The habit-
ual criminals statute mandates that any person convicted of two or
more felony offenses "'arising from separate and distinct incidents
and sentenced on two or more such occasions to serve a term in
prison'" shall be deemed a habitual criminal if he is convicted in
Rhode Island of another felony.36 Defendant had been previously
convicted in Utah of two separate offenses, but the sentences were
imposed together on the same date and he was ordered to serve
those sentences concurrently.3 7 The court found 12-19-21(a) to be
ambiguous and held that the predicate sentences for the imposi-
tion of the habitual criminal penalty must "occur sequentially."38
Thus, because the predicate sentences in defendant's case were im-
posed on the same day, they would not trigger 12-19-21(a).39 How-
ever, defendant also had previous convictions in Rhode Island, but
the state had failed at trial to properly authenticate the docket face
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 923.
36. Id. at 923-24 (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-21(a) (2000)) (emphasis in
original).
37. Id. at 923.
38. Id. at 924.
39. See id.
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sheets as required in 12-19-21(b). 40 The state argued on appeal
that the trial justice should have taken the Rhode Island convic-
tions into account.41 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
the trial justice was not in error as 12-19-21(b) required authenti-
cated copies of former judgments, and that the imposition of the
habitual offender sentence must be vacated.42 However, the state
was not precluded from again seeking a sentence under 12-19-
21(a) and the matter was remanded back to the Superior Court. 43
CONCLUSION
In State v. Smith, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held there
was sufficient evidence that defendant's oral, written, and taped
statements to police were voluntary, and that the record supported
a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, but
that the state failed to show that defendant had two prior convic-
tions and sentences that would qualify him for sentencing as a ha-
bitual criminal.
Joseph M. Proietta
40. Id. at 925.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Spencer, 783 A.2d 413 (R.I. 2001). Stan-
dard for determining if waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent
and voluntary is a totality of the circumstances in light of the stage
of the proceedings.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On June 15, 1998 the owner of ABC Travel in Pawtucket,
Rhode Island was robbed at gunpoint by a person subsequently
identified as Lee Spencer.' During the robbery, the victim's
screams alerted an occupant of a nearby shop who then attempted
to help the victim.2 Though the victim was unable to positively
identify Spencer, a person who came to the victim's aid confirmed
his identification from a photo array of six people. 3
On December 11, 1998 a grand jury indicted Spencer with one
count of first-degree robbery and two counts of felonious assault.4
On May 12, 1999 defense counsel entered appearance on Spencer's
behalf and the trial commenced on September 9, 1999.5 At the
trial, following the state's case in chief and during cross-examina-
tion of the victim, defense counsel informed the court that defen-
dant Spencer wished to complete the rest of the victim's cross-
examination himself and desired to represent himself for the rest
of the trial.6 A colloquy between the court and the defendant Spen-
cer ensued.7
Spencer represented himself for the remainder of the trial
with defense counsel remaining as standby counsel to assist and
advise.8 Following Spencer's conviction, defense counsel resumed
representation of the defendant at a hearing on a motion for a new
trial and at the sentencing.9 Motion for new trial was denied and
Spencer was sentenced to thirty years at the Adult Correctional
Institutions for robbery, fifteen to serve.' 0
1. State v. Spencer, 783 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I. 2001)
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 416.
9. Id.
10. Id.
20021 463
464 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:403
Defendant appealed the conviction alleging that the trial jus-
tice had failed to properly inquire as to the waiver of counsel and
failed to determine that his waiver was made knowingly, intelli-
gently and voluntarily." Additionally, defendant argued that the
grand jury indictment should be dismissed for prosecutorial
misconduct. 12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States permits a defendant to represent himself at trial, provided
he has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.13 "The
defendant must be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."14
After briefly citing several accepted methods for determining
when a waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary and intelligent, the
court held that its preferred method is to view the waiver in light
of the totality of the circumstances with consideration given to
which stage of the proceeding the waiver occurred. 15
In finding that the trial judge correctly found Spencer's waiver
knowing, intelligent and voluntary, the court cited Spencer's de-
tailed pre-trial testimony reflecting his awareness of the gravity of
his crime, his familiarity with the criminal justice system and his
affirmative, assertive responses to questions of his capability to re-
present himself pro se.' 6 Additionally, the court found it impor-
tant that Spencer had the benefit of counsel before his trial, during
a significant portion of his trial, and following his trial during the
sentencing phase.' 7 Lastly, noting the fact that defense counsel
was directed to act as standby counsel following Spencer's waiver
provided the defendant the benefit of using standby counsel to ad-
vise him on matters of law with which he was not familiar.18
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975)).
14. Id. (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States, 317
U.S. 269, 279 (1942)(internal citations omitted))).
15. Id. at 417.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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The court was mildly critical of the trial justice for several rea-
sons. First, the court felt the trial justice should have engaged in a
more detailed colloquy with the defendant. 19 Secondly, the court
noted that the trial judge had been under the mistaken belief that
there was no choice but to let the defendant waive counsel at that
particular stage of the proceeding.20 However, these issues were
not dispositive and did not affect the court's finding that under a
totality of the circumstances analysis; defendant Spencer's mid-
trial waiver was not defective.21
Turning to the defendant's argument that prosecutorial mis-
conduct during the grand jury proceeding justified a dismissal of
his indictment, the court held that dismissal of an indictment was
a remedy reserved for only the most extreme circumstances. 22 The
introduction of evidence to the grand jury that defendant Spencer
failed a computerized voice stress analysis test was prejudicial and
inappropriate, but not dispositive because other evidence intro-
duced during the proceeding was sufficient to establish probable
cause.23 Ultimately, the conviction and the fact that inadmissible
evidence was not introduced during trial warranted affirmation of
the indictment. 24
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of
defendant who waived his right to counsel mid-trial holding that
waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary based upon a total-
ity of the circumstances analysis. Additionally, defendant's deci-
sion to waive counsel in the middle of his trial led credence to the
court's finding that his pro se representation was chosen in full
light of the possibility of negative consequences. Defendant's ap-
peal was dismissed.
Jill A. Taft
19. Id. at 417-18.
20. Id. at 418.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Verrecchia, 766 A.2d 377 (R.I. 2001). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the defendant had estab-
lished an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a leased
garage unit by virtue of his status as sole leaseholder and requisite
ability to exclude access to the garage area. The supreme court
remanded the case to the superior court for a hearing on the merits
of the defendant's motion to suppress the guns and other evidence
removed from the garage.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The Defendant, Albert Verrecchia (Verrecchia) was arrested
on May 19, 1996, charged with two counts of receiving stolen
goods.' Verrecchia was a member of a local crime syndicate known
as the "Gold Nugget Group" (GNG), and his arrest was the product
of a government sting operation. 2 Michael Rossi (Rossi), another
GNG member who was allegedly involved in earlier criminal activ-
ity with Verrecchia, had been previously arrested and incarcerated
for other offenses.3 In exchange for better treatment, Rossi agreed
to assist the police by arranging to have Verrecchia, whom Rossi
described as the "custodian of GNG's arsenal," sell some of GNG's
stockpiled weapons to an undercover police detective. 4
Since Rossi was incarcerated, the sting operation devised by
the police began with Rossi meeting Verrecchia while in prison and
asking him to sell different pieces of the GNG arsenal to a fellow
inmate who would soon be released, nicknamed "The Ghost."5 The
individual posing as "The Ghost" was an undercover police detec-
tive.6 After Verrechia agreed to complete this transaction, the gov-
ernment moved into part two of their operation by having the
undercover detective telephone Verrecchia and arrange to meet
with him to buy GNG weapons. 7 After Verrecchia's meeting with
"The Ghost," the police arrested Verrecchia for possessing two sto-
len guns.8 Verrecchia was eventually charged with an additional
sixty-seven crimes as a result of both Rossi's testimony and the
1. State v. Verrecchia, 766 A.2d 377, 380-81 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 381.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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evidence seized as a result of the sting operation. 9 At least a por-
tion of this evidence was contained in a rented garage, leased in
Verrecchia's name, which the police searched after obtaining a
warrant.10
After going through seven different defense attorneys,'1 Ver-
recchia's case finally began on January 12, 1999, and concluded on
February 9, 1999, with a guilty verdict found on twenty-nine out of
sixty-six counts submitted to the jury.12 On appeal, Verrecchia's
primary argument' 3 was that the trial justice erred in denying his
motion to suppress the guns and other evidence the police obtained
in their search of Verrecchia's rented garage. 14 Specifically, Ver-
recchia challenged the trial justice's ruling that he had no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the leased garage. 15 As a result of
the trial justice's determination on this issue, the justice did not
reach the merits of Verrecchia's motion to suppress. 16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In order for a defendant in a criminal proceeding to contest the
seizure of evidence as unlawful, the defendant must have "enjoyed
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Over the course of approximately thirty months that Verrecchia
awaited trial he was represented by as many as seven different attorneys in suc-
cession one after another. For "sundry reasons" Verrecchia was unable to main-
tain a relationship with any of these different attorneys for more than a short
period of time. Id.
12. Id. Although the original indictment included sixty-nine counts against
Verrecchia, three counts were dismissed. Id. at 381-82, n. 2.
13. Verrecchia also asserted on appeal that the state deprived him of his con-
stitutional right to a speedy trial, that the trial justice abused his discretion by
failing to sever a large number of the different counts that Verrecchia faced, and
that the trial justice erred in failing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defenses
of entrapment and duress. Id. at 380-81. The Rhode Island Supreme Court re-
jected all three of these arguments. See id. at 384-86 (concluding that the delay
Verrecchia experienced was of his own making through his decision to change
counsel multiple times, that no cognizable prejudice to Verrecchia resulted, and
holding that Verrecchia's right to a speedy trial was not violated by the state); see
also id. at 386-87 (holding that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in
declining to hold more than fifty separate trials in this matter); see also id. at 387-
91 (holding that Verrecchia did not meet the necessary prerequisite burden of
proof to be entitled to a jury instruction on the affirmative defenses of either en-
trapment or duress).
14. Id. at 380-81.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises or property
that was the subject of the search."17 In this proceeding, Ver-
recchia had the burden of proving that his alleged expectation of
privacy was such that society would be prepared to recognize that
expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable.' 8 The Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court identified several factors that it has histori-
cally considered in determining whether an asserted personal
privacy expectation is objectively reasonable. 19 These factors each
relate to the amount of control a person exerts over the area
searched and the exclusivity of that control.
The supreme court agreed with the trial justice that Ver-
recchia was the legal tenant of the garage compartment in ques-
tion, having rented it from its owner at a fee of $200 per month
four years before the police searched the garage.20 The evidence
showed that Verrecchia had paid his rent each month in either
cash or services, and that Verrecchia was in possession of the only
known key to the garage.21 The rented garage had two possible
means of entry, a side door which could be opened with Ver-
recchia's key, and large front doors. The trial justice found that
while Verrecchia established that he possessed the only key to the
side door, the record was silent as to possible access into the garage
space through the front doors.22 As a result, the trial justice in-
ferred that the owners of the garage were able to enter the garage
through these front doors and, by virtue of this means of entry,
17. Id. at 382 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); State v.
Wright, 558 A.2d 946, 948 (R.I. 1989)).
18. Id. (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988); State v. Briggs,
756 A.2d 731, 741 (R.I. 2000)).
19. In determining whether an asserted right of privacy is objectively reasona-
ble, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has considered "whether the suspect pos-
sessed or owned the area searched or the property seized; his or her prior use of the
area searched or the property seized; the person's ability to control or exclude
others' use of the property; and the person's legitimate presence in the area
searched." Id. at 382 (citing Briggs, 756 A.2d at 741; State v. Pena Lora, 746 A.2d
113, 118-19 (R.I. 2000); Wright, 558 A.2d at 949).
20. Id. at 382.
21. The owner of the garage testified that Verrecchia possessed the only key to
the garage, and that the owner had not retained a set of keys when he rented the
compartment. Further, the owner testified that since he had rented the space to
Verrecchia he had not entered the garage at all, except on one occasion in Ver-
recchia's presence to examine water damage. Id. In addition, the supreme court
noted that the property owner later testified that he did not possess keys to the
large front doors of the garage, and that, in fact, no such keys existed. Id. at 383.
22. Id. at 382.
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control access to the garage. 23 Through this inference, the trial
justice determined that the garage owners retained the ability to
facilitate or exclude access to the garage, and that Verrecchia did
not truly "posse[ss] the ability to exclude others from entering
through the front doors."24 In light of this conclusion, the trial jus-
tice held that Verrecchia did not possess an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to the garage, and as a result
could not contest the seizure of property contained within the
structure.
25
The supreme court disagreed with the trial justice's conclusion
on this issue. The supreme court noted that as a commercial ten-
ant in good standing, Verrecchia had a possessory interest in the
garage that would enable him to exclude others from the garage
during his tenancy, including the owners of the structure. 26 Fur-
ther, the supreme court stated that if the property owners had at-
tempted to enter Verrecchia's rented garage during his tenancy,
Verrecchia could have either enjoined them from using the prop-
erty or ousted them as trespassers. 27 The court noted that Ver-
recchia's legal ability to exclude trespassers applied not only to the
property owners, but anyone else who might attempt to enter Ver-
recchia's property during his tenancy. 28
As a result, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Ver-
recchia had established an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in the leased garage.2 9 This expectation of privacy was not
undermined by the fact that Verrecchia admitted making four cop-
ies of his set of garage keys and distributing them to four different
individuals. 30 Because Verrecchia retained control over the garage
as a sole tenant, and did not share his tenancy with the other key
holders, he could terminate their access to the garage at any time.
The supreme court emphasized that "'an individual need not main-
tain absolute personal control (exclusive use) over an area to sup-
port his expectation of privacy'-as long as that individual retains
23. Id. at 382-83.
24. Id. at 383.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing 42 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant, § 485 at 402 (1985)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 384.
30. Id.
2002]
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some ability to control or exclude others from using the area."3 1
The supreme court held that Verrecchia retained sufficient control
over the garage to meet his burden of establishing an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy therein.32
CONCLUSION
In State v. Verrecchia, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the defendant had established an objectively reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in a leased garage unit, thereby enabling the
defendant's pre-trial motion to suppress evidence confiscated from
this garage to be heard on the merits. The supreme court re-
manded the case to the superior court for a hearing on Verrecchia's
motion to suppress the guns and other evidence removed from the
garage.33
Lucy H. Holmes
31. Id. (quoting United States v. Horowitz, 806 F.2d 1222, 1226 (4th Cir.
1986)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
